NOT ON THIS EASEL: No mistaking what that means.

UNC NATEX Election 2k10 Preliminary DMO Report: The fire next time?

2010-02-14T06:49:00.005-05:00

Circulated via email on 26 January 2010 19:17

Dear Honourable Elected Gentlemen and Gentlewomen who contested against and or openly decried and or campaigned against the "KamJack" candidates,

Someone has to break this bit of news to you:

In case you haven't yet gotten it, in the absence of a constitutional recall provision, the just-concluded National Executive election was, in fact, as much a referendum on your performance as parliamentary, local government or trade union representatives as it was on your guardianship of the party since you assumed the latter office.

That, except for Comrade Wade, the results turned overwhelmingly against each one of you ---especially, horror of horrors, in your own constituency--- shows quite vividly how despicable your performance as such representative had become ---in the eyes of the voters who, formerly, were utterly devoted to you, for, if your performance as parliamentary, local government or trade union representative was what it was, one of two things would have happened:

You would have not been humiliated in your own constituency,
You would have accurately read the vibes of your constituents, thus been an avid supporter of the "KamJack" team.

It's now history what took place, therefore, if, somehow, you are to retain the salutation of honour for the time being prefixing your names, you must do the honourable thing and forthwith resign from elected parliamentary, local government or trade union office, to let fresh minds vie for the thus-created slew of positions.

Any otherwise course, I fear, shall leave the newly-elected Political Leader with a string of albatrosses neath her tresses, which, in short order, may raise the still-seething ire of the waves who rejected you to such a pitch that'd ignite a fire next time.

Time to put a woman on the hill overlooking the frontline.

2010-01-31T08:39:00.000-05:00

This was emailed on January 19th, 2010 and published in The Trinidad Newsday on January 22nd, 2010, but, inadvertently, not posted on my Paradigm Shifting Trinbago" blog:

The longstanding tradition in military operations is for the Commander-in-Chief to be ensconced in some vantage point wherefrom the frontlines, flanks and rear may be properly observed, the better for the Commander-in-Chief to direct the cut and thrust of might and main.

Now! In Trinidad and Tobago of late, a woman could be a police officer, a soldier, aa doctor, a lawyer, a magistrate, a judge, a Cabinet Minister, a Member of Parliament, a Permanent Secretary, a CEO, an engineer, an electrician, aa mason, a carpenter, a bus driver, a professional boxer, yet, to date, it seems, though, Lord knows, they've tried, not a Commander-in-Chief.

The sole reason they have not been is that, though they are in charge ---heck! In one case, one Commander-in-Chief swore that, in his home, such is the case--- the harsh reality is that a tight-knit, exclusively-male cabal calls the shots as to how high up the scheme of things woman may perch.

As man I tell you it's time to dispense with such backward notions. There's no more powerful or influential force than the hand that rocks the cradle. Let us men steel our nerves and rock the boat --- it's time to put a woman on the hill overlooking the frontline! fire officer, welder,

The Future of Football : A Global Perspective, by His Excellency, Austin Jack Warner of Trinidad and Tobago

2009-10-08T00:43:00.008-04:00

Jack Warner
Vice President, FIFA
President, CONCACAF

The future of football: A global perspective

Leaders of Football Conference
London
October 7th 2009

It is a pleasure to be here with you this morning. How very kind of you to lay on such special weather to greet my arrival.

I am going to talk on the subject “The Future of Football: A global perspective” and I am already off to a good start because of you. I can think of no finer audience to have.

We all love football and we all know there are some big challenges ahead. We can share our ideas here. I am confident that by the end of the Summit we will have mapped out a future for football as a sport, as an industry and as something rather special in our lives.

There is a lot happening - new ownerships, new technologies, new ideas and new regulations. Our challenge is to embrace what’s good and what works and not be distracted by the restI am going to suggest a number of changes to the game. You’ll find some challenging and some controversial. I’ve been around a few years but how exciting is this – you and I here now plotting a new future for football?

Probably, the most significant visionary was the great sixteenth century advocate of football, Richard Mulcaster. I remember him telling me just what needed to be done!

Mulcaster had the natural talent to see beyond the ordinary and to offer a path to develop this beautiful game. His pronouncements on football post 1550 presented football as beneficial to education, health and fitness. But it had to be done better – his big ideas were to limit the number of players on the field and to introduce a referee.

Sad to say there was not an immediate response to Mulcaster as evidenced by Shakespeare’s reference in King Lear where Kent refers to Oswald as “a base football player” or James I’s attempt to outlaw the game. But the very recommendations of Mulcaster did come to pass. The number of players on the field was indeed limited and an arbiter of the game, the referee, was appointed.

Mulcaster set us on the right path. He is looking down on us now and saying – I did my bit, now you people, get on with it.

If only it was so easy! Not all football federations or even clubs around the globe face the same challenges. Certainly, a large number of football clubs, within the many associations with which I am familiar, have different challenges to the ones faced by European clubs. But football is football regardless of the country where it is played and since European activity affects us all one way or the other, we all need to look at the organisation of the game here in Europe.

UEFA is the body that is responsible for the administration of football throughout Europe. Its demographics boast of a population of some seven hundred million from fifty-three nation states. A sum total of fifty-three leagues is run.

This is the dream of any Confederation wishing to obtain sponsorship. Sponsors are looking for a mass audience to promote their brands.

Let us not forget TV rights. Based on information provided by Troels Troelsen, and these are conservative figures since the figures relating to TV Rights are generally confidential, the total for all TV rights for all of European Football per year is roughly 9.8 billion US dollars. I am advised this is equitably distributed across the fifty-three leagues, with a small percentage being retained by UEFA to cover its administrative costs.

Europe has also seen the emergence of the wealthy club owner and the development of mega clubs. We’re not talking about just European businessmen such as Roman Abramovich or the Uzbekistan businessman who owns a large share of Arsenal, but also the North American magnate Malcolm Glazer and his family, and Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

The Football Rich List identifies the top ten owners of football clubs based on their wealth. For the 2009 season, eleven owners/major investors were identified, because there was a tie at number ten, but what is most interesting is that eight of the top ten rich list are owners and have major investments in the English Premier League Clubs, in the English Coca Cola Championship League and in the Scottish Premier League.

Of the top five income earning football clubs; three are from the English Premier League and two from the Spanish La Liga and though Barcelona won the Champions League in 2008, three of the top four finalists were clubs from the English Premier League.

Within UEFA, English clubs are the major beneficiaries of this affluent owner phenomenon. There is an impact on the team’s ability to raise revenue and demonstrates what seems to be a correlation between the affluence of the club, the success of the club and high visibility of the national league.

So the questions that one must ask are whether the emergence of this new breed of owner/manager/investor into football clubs is a good thing or a bad thing? Is it sustainable? Does it possess the ability to develop the sport? Can this model assist the needs of the other Associations? Why would investors choose clubs from the English Premier League and what comparative or even absolute advantage does the English Premier League have over the other fifty-two national leagues run across Europe? Finally, what is required to level the playing field if and when required?

Whatever the answers, we need to make sure that at the end of the day football is the winner.

First of all, the injection of wealth from wealthy business people provides the opportunity for clubs to negotiate for the best footballers from anywhere in the world.

Next is the sponsorship. Companies want to be associated with clubs that have the talent and are going places. Such clubs promote their brands. So more revenue comes in, clubs can afford additional big name players, and they develop a line up of super stars. That gets the fans excited. So the number of spectators increases, and not just the fans at home. These clubs develop more of an international following.

The players themselves get a better compensation package. The competition is high among the players to keep their places in the final eleven. A player who loses his edge is quickly transferred and his pay package downgraded. The quality of football on the field stays high.

All of this has been very exciting. But it worries me too, because the playing field is not level and other teams can and do get left way behind.

If investment empowers these clubs to attract the best sportsmen we should never discourage it, especially when the revenue is directed to one of the other fifty-three leagues and not the same-old-same-old leagues across Europe.

The challenge is how we could use this current condition of affluence within football to develop a global appeal for the game that makes football the preferential if not the absolute option for all youths in every territory. I have a few suggestions that will help us chart that course.

i. I believe that a salary cap should be introduced to allow for a more level playing field among the clubs. This is necessary because poorer clubs will never, ever be able to compete with high spending ones. Look at clubs in two of the big leagues in Europe for example. In the Barclays Premiership League, four clubs have been dominant over the past decade. Manchester United, Chelsea, Arsenal and Liverpool. Manchester City’s current injection of funds through new ownership has now taken them to another level but it is the weight of the pay cheque in these clubs which allow them to dominate. The same can be said of Barcelona and Real Madrid. I wish to argue that salary caps will allow clubs a more equal access to good players and will level the playing field when it comes to the opportunity to win.

ii. We need quotas. Real Madrid should not be allowed to field a team without a Spanish player. Neither should Liverpool be able to do it in England. I know there has been opposition to this, and litigation has been won against the Football Associations as in the Bosman case in the late 1990s, but it is necessary for a quota system to be introduced if the local territories are to benefit from the current affluence within football. Ethics require a number of local players being selected and fielded for each club. Clubs must come to the table and for the good of football agree to a plan. Am I hearing 6 + 5? 7 + 4? 8 + 3 or the reverse?

iii. Clubs should invest at least ten percent of the earnings of their players in the territories from which they were contracted, and these funds should be used specifically for the development of grass roots football and the growing of home grown players. Clubs should also have training academies in the areas where they are located so as to develop young players from surrounding communities. These youngsters must have a preferential option for selection on the club team. Clubs may also be able to even assist their National Associations in having their countries' own National Training Centres and countries, like England, will not have to go, cap in hand, no boots on feet, to train at a club's Training Centre.

iv. The wealth of the clubs must not be used to deter national pride. The current commoditization of football has created a constant struggle for the player who wants to play for country but is debarred from doing so by club. This is because the investment in the player is not perceived as an investment in football but rather an investment to position the club for rewards.

I understand the difficulty clubs face but it is outrageous to want to contract the best players from different countries and then rape them of their national pride.

Having the best players on show serves as an incentive for all countries especially when winning can result in gains to that football country. So for the good of football, clubs should agree to an unwritten ethic which allows them to free the player for national duty, if not unconditionally, certainly in ways that would not put a player in the position of having to choose between club and country.

On the global level, I am suggesting that at least 6 weeks and possibly as many as 8 weeks be designated when there will be NO football involving professional players! None! Anywhere, for any reason! This will allow players to recover and to give some breathing space from the pressures of club versus country, if only for a short while.At the same time, I am even suggesting that the training of coaches should be uniformly applied.. Why should it takes some 33 weeks, I am advised, for a German to become a fully qualified football coach and, in England,for example, it takes some 6 - 8 weeks ! ! ! Does a guy merely with a hammer in his hand and some nails in his mouth become a carpenter ? Does a guy with some cement on his clothes and a trowel in his hand become a mason ? Why is it therefore so easy for an English guy who does an 8 week coaching course,at most, to become a club coach ? And people are asking themselves why England should have to depend on foreign coaches!!!

v. The current injection of money into clubs should also be used to fund scholarships in local support services - physiotherapy, coaching, sports science, strength and conditioning to name a few. In this way, they assist in the human capital development of the community which supports them.

vi. The clubs should not bear these burdens alone. The Federations to which they belong should also take on some of this responsibility to the wider world of football and to society. In fact, I would throw out a challenge to any one of the Federations, particularly those of the UEFA to act as regulators in not only ensuring, but in actively promoting the notion of football having a responsibility to society. We at FIFA have already indicated that all Federations’ bids to host a World Cup must contain some aspect of development at the grassroots level. Perhaps for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups we could even consider that such programmes go beyond development at home only, and be extended to lesser developed MAs. As I speak of 2018/2022, let me state quite clearly, that the CONCACAF votes on the FIFA Executive Committee have not been assigned to any country as yet except possibly the US whenever that time comes and therefore I ask all of you to disabuse yourself of any other belief.

In December 2010 we, in CONCACAF, shall make a decision based on the good of the sport and the good of CONCACAF!

vii. Next - indebtedness. While many clubs have affluent owners there is a level of disconnect between the wealth of the owners and the debt owed by the clubs. My own view is that such a condition is not healthy for the future of football. From a global perspective some sort of sanction should be employed in order to safeguard the financial integrity of the club. In Europe, for instance, banning a club in excessive debt from participation at all European competitions would force club owners to make more prudent financial decisions and also level the playing field for clubs whose capital does not afford them the luxury to borrow with the latitude of other high profile clubs. But for the future of football, something must be done to treat with this indebtedness.

I know that many of these ideas are not new and they will meet much resistance from clubs across Europe today and tomorrow as they did yesterday but the truth is while I understand the implications both legal and social of some of the suggestions I have raised, I am of the view that we must sit and talk to ensure that football is the winner not only for the now but also for the future.

I also want to talk about technologies and how they will impact on the future of football. Over the past fifteen years, the use of technology in sport has made major strides as sportsmen in the pursuit of perfection utilized many smart machines.

These forms of technology - once in their embryonic stages - are well advanced and are now producing accurate records about the human body. Coaches don’t leave it to chance but depend on technology to determine the fitness levels and suitability of the athlete to play football; the dependence on these machines will be even more pronounced in the future.

A major shift, specifically for football, has been in the design of equipment to aid the super athlete in becoming the quintessence of his or her time. Many resources have been invested in research and development to produce the type of footwear that could stand the rigours of the game, the turning, the tackling, the running and the jumping with a view to develop football boots that can withstand the demands of the game.

Much time has been spent tinkering with the material to ensure that it is lighter, more flexible and even more responsive to the athlete. In some cases footballers have the football boots specially designed for their feet to allow for a closer and better fit. Even the balls are not the same. The players of the sixties would have welcomed these shifts and the benefits they have already brought to the sport.

The real impact of technology on the sport for the future, however, has to be in two specific areas: the first is the adjudication of the sport and the second has to be the provision of an equitable return on investment for the spectator who will be called upon to pay even larger entrance fees to watch the game.

When it comes to adjudication, in most sports, there is always discontent with regard to the arbitration. It has even been known for a referee to face the odd obscenity! Or, even more recently, the odd accusation about his fitness!!!

In at least two sports, the use of technology has been applied to reduce the levels of uncertainty in the decision making process. But it’s not all sweetness and light. In cricket (a dying sport) we have seen that, despite the technology, there is no guarantee that the decision made will be the right one and with tennis, we realize how the use of technology can lead to abuse. Roger Federer made no bones about it during his finals at the US Open 2009.

The truth is nothing is perfect but new technology does provide a medium of relief, and cultivates an atmosphere of comfort for the players, spectators and adjudicators. The use of technology must never be at the expense of the arbiters of the game. Protocols regarding the use of technology must be agreed to. Technology should be employed as an adjudicator’s aid and not as a replacement. It should be designed not as a tool to which the players can appeal but rather as a device to which the arbiter can turn to when in doubt.

I keep hearing that there is collaboration to develop a smart ball. I have read that Cairos Technologies, Fraunhofer Institute for integrated Circuits and Addidas have managed to put a chip in the ball to help referees in the decision making process, tracking the ball when it goes over the goal line and the referee is out of position to make an informed call. If this can aid us in making the game appear fairer then we should embrace it. Justice must not only be done; it must seem to be done. The use of technology to aid our referees will be a move in the right direction.

My second observation has to do with the measurement of real play time on the pitch. Technology should be used to ensure that spectators get the returns commiserate with their entrance fee. When I pay to watch a football game, I pay to see ninety minutes of football or close to it. Tracking devices currently being used even at the FIFA U-20 World Cup Finals Egypt 2009 reveal that real play time on the field in one half of the game can be as low as 22 minutes.

Technology, along with a revision of the rules of the game, can provide the spectator with better “bang” for his “buck”. It is here I think of Mulcaster and today I send a clarion call for all of us to do something to increase the playing time. The technology has clearly shown that a lot of time wasting is spent during the game and maybe, just maybe, we need to restrict the time allocated to throw the ball back in play or take corners and free kicks just as in Futsal.

People are not paying good money to watch players do a bit of amateur acting. We’ve seen them spend minutes on the ground rolling with pain but on the arrival of the stretcher, like Lazarus in the scriptures,they casually get up and walk. Spectators pay to watch a 90 minute match and sometimes get 44 minutes of real time play. That is simply unacceptable and the technology should be used to address this.

So technological advancement in football is not going to wait for our affirmation, it has already begun to take root; let us embrace it. Better equipment, fitter athletes and even faster recovery from injury through prevention and the use of rehabilitation techniques such as ultrasound and laser therapy will benefit the sport.

On the subjects of real play time and football as entertainment, this is what makes the game so beautiful. A fan, a spectator wants to see entertaining football; good football; he wants to see players demonstrating their talents and skills. The fans want to be entertained. What can be done to ensure that a fan gets 90 full minutes of entertainment?

What can be done so that players are even more challenged on the field of play with no “dead ball” time? Who is to say that the rules cannot be changed and instead of 11 players on the field, a team is comprised of 10 players? Ten players certainly allow more space for creative play and makes it harder for teams to “park the bus across the goal”. Who is to say that goals cannot be 9 feet by 9 yards to encourage more goals; a smaller penalty area to put goal keepers under more pressure?

In my country we have something called “small goal” played mainly at the grassroots level. A more fast-paced and entertaining spectacle cannot be imagined. My point is that there is no reason that the game should remain static for another 500 years. As leaders in the field, we can and should allow the game to develop and evolve so that 500 years from now, someone can stand in front of an audience such as this and be able to say that Joe Bloke, in 2010, changed the way the game was played to what we have today.

Maybe a major shift might be to attempt to use a GPS system to track each player on the pitch to monitor his outcome. One thing is for sure, technology is the way of life for the future and we should embrace it. It must not embrace us, It should not be our master but our aid.

The final area I want to look at is the birth of new ideas and the significance of these to the future development of football.

During the past decade, the President of FIFA, Sepp Blatter made the pronouncement that “the future of football is feminine.” His prophetic utterance was greeted by some and jeered at silently by many who saw neither the wisdom of his pronouncement nor contemplated the impact that the acceptance of women in football would have on the beautiful game.

Some felt that the additional resources being allocated to women would have been better spent on the development of the male side at the grassroots level. But we’ve had female world cup after female world cup; from Hamm to Prinz to Marta.

Women took to the global stage, and the astounding figures in terms of spectator support in Chile and New Zealand and next year in Trinidad & Tobago and television audiences proved one thing - and that is, that the FIFA President’s statement wasn’t just a bit of politics. Women’s football has come alive.

Very few understood then the implications of such a statement but we believed in Mr. Blatter as a friend and as a leader. His vision has led to programmes such as the Women’s Legacy Project – making football a preferential option for girls.

No one contemplated then or even now that placing the focus on women would have such an impact - not just on women’s football but on football in general. I do not know whether my good friend Mr. Blatter is a science major or whether he studied extensively in the field of biology but from all accounts it seems that it makes sense to focus on women in sport. Am I hearing of a Barclays Premier League for Women’s Football? or a Champions’ League ?

My mission is to tease your brain so as this seminar develops, areas for research and development to make the beautiful game even more beautiful would be tabled for discussion and it is here I believe real research is necessary not only for football but for all sports at large.

It is ideas like President Blatter’s that will guarantee a special place for football in the future. It is the unselfish nature of football to entertain and bring national pride to countries that makes us special.

It is the reason why we, in football, are the leaders against racism and sexism; the voice for AIDS and the marginalized and oppressed; the statement of non-tolerance for those who wish to destroy their bodies through the use and abuse of illegal drugs and the vehicle through which governments believe that all social ills can be cured.

Football will always be a pioneering sport developing continually and continuously changing shape to make the players fit and seeking a way to make society better.

So the future of football is secure, not because of the wealth it attracts but because it is entertaining. It is a sustainable tool that fosters social capital and human development and most of all provides opportunities for those whose talents find little resonance in the classroom. It also provides for so many, the only forms of discipline and acceptance of the concept of "others" - the Team - over self.

As I indicated at the start of this presentation, the very organisation of this topic made it Eurocentric and this means that UEFA, probably the most powerful Confederation, needs to emerge with a pattern which can be emulated and implemented by other Confederations across the world. England, too, will have to do away with its present system of not duplication but triplication in its football administration - we have the FA, the Football League and the Premier League - but more about that at another time and at another Conference like this ! ! !

Many of the areas explored this morning are evident at varying levels across Europe, but as one family we have to find a way to make sure that what we do and where ever we do it, it benefits the world family at large.

The injection of large sums of money into the sport may help the sport in the short term but as a sport, we have survived without mega-clubs and most of them --such as Liverpool and Manchester United-- built their reputation a long time ago, which is what attracted the big buyers today.

The increased use of technology may assist us as we chart a course forward but we must embrace it carefully. It is the movers and shakers, the people who really love the game who are the ones who will secure a future for the sport in perpetuity. It is the players, the administrators, the arbiters, the sponsors, the spectators, and the media who will etch this sport indelibly into the annals of history. It is visionaries, such as Sepp Blatter, who live just to think football - much like Mulcaster - who will create for us more beauty in the beautiful game.

To secure the future we need to sit down and forget about our own objectives and talk about what we can do to make football the winner. Hierarchical organisations should become more transparent. Club owners must become more responsible. A pragmatic ethic must develop that allows for fairness in the administration and playing of the sport.

The laws which govern nation states may not at all times be in the best interest of football but where we can get together and come to a common understanding for the good of the game we need to do it.

For me, the future is not 2020: in Trinidad and Tobago the country from which I come, people would have laughed. The future, for me, is the next moment, the next minute, the next hour, the next day! And, so, when we speak about the future of football from a global perspective, we must ask, moment by moment, what am I doing now to make the sport better the very next minute of my existence?

It is that sitz en leben [that lived experience] only for football, that will secure us a place in the hearts of all perpetually.

Let me therefore wish you well as you continue your discussions and ponder on the thoughts which, hopefully, my contribution has raised. I sincerely hope that this will not be just another talking shop but that the outcome will manifest a praxis backed by the discussions which would have taken place here during this week.

This has been a humbling experience for me; the invitation --the planning and the presentation-- but it has also been a most pleasurable one because I know that football as I know it is in good hands.

You have been kind to listen to me for so long. I went well into injury time. I don’t have a whistle to blow but I’m going to give myself a red card before you send a stretcher my way.
Thank you for listening!

How the USA can save itself from future financial collapse.

2009-09-24T13:34:00.003-04:00

Solution...permanent and sole: ISLAMIC BANKING SYSTEM!

That way, the owners of banks bear the whole and sole brunt of every penny lent, since, when lending, they'd be assuming ownership of the thing being acquired by the loan funds ---whether that thing is a mattress or a hydroelectric plant--- therefore, they'd dang well have to walk constantly with the borrower to ensure the funds are used for the given purpose and the project managed in a way to warranty repayment of the advance with a reasonable return.

"Ya ayyuha allatheena amanoo la takuloo amwalakum baynakum bialbatili illa an takoona tijaratan AAan taradin minkum wala taqtuloo anfusakum inna Allaha kana bikum raheeman."

"O ye who believe! Squander not your wealth among yourselves in vanity, except it be a trade by mutual consent, and kill not one another. Lo! Allah is ever Merciful unto you."

The Glorious Q'ran - Sura 4: an Nisa [Verse 29]

UNC Political Leader and Opposition Leader.

2008-06-29T08:26:00.004-04:00

December 12th 2005.

Greetings!

This one saying this! That one saying that! The other saying the other!

Lord! Please put a hand!

And the one who is saying nothing is the only one who has the real say!

By that I mean- the President. Because it’s the President and the President ALONE, who chooses or replaces the Leader of the Opposition. Ask Raffique Shah and others, they will tell you the same thing!

Or, if you do not believe me, check for yourself what Section 83 of our Constitution has to say about the appointing and the disappointing of the Leader of the Opposition:

In Section 83 (2) it says that the President is bound to appoint as Opposition Leader, the Member of the House of Representatives:

1. who is willing to accept the appointment, and who,

2. in his (the President’s) judgement, and his judgement alone, is best able to command the support of the greatest number of the members…WHO DO NOT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT.

Notice carefully, the Constitution says, “the greatest number”; it does not say, “the majority” of those members. So, if there are sixteen members not supporting the Government, and of such sixteen one member commands the support of five, besides himself, and, of such sixteen, another member commands the support of six, besides himself, and, of such sixteen, none of the remaining three members supports anybody else, besides himself, then, of such sixteen, the member who has the support of six, besides himself, shall be appointed as Opposition Leader.

And how does one determine whether a member of the House of Representatives is supportive of the Government? Only by the way the member votes, when required so to do, not by the member promising yes, I will support, or no, I will not support.

And, from what the Constitution prescribes, it correctly can be deduced that, should the members of the House of Representatives who originally were not supporting the Government, start, for whatever reason, to support the Government, then there would be no need for an Opposition Leader. (By the way, all those persons who write in to the newspapers, or call in to the TV and radio stations pontificating that the Opposition is a part of the Government, I do hope that they take careful not of how the Constitution defines the Opposition, eh?)

Now Sections 83 (3), (4) and (5) provide that the Opposition Leader’s office becomes vacant if:

1. The Opposition Leader resigns (that makes sense); or if

2. The Opposition Leader is no longer a member of the House, except if he’s no longer in the House only because the House has been dissolved (you know, when there is going to be fresh General Elections) in which case he continues to be Leader of the Opposition at least until the new House first meets after a General Election; or if

3. The person who was in the post of Opposition Leader is no longer a member of the House when the new House first meets after a General Election, because he had lost he seat in the General Election (that too makes sense); or if

4. Where under Section 49 (3) he is compelled to cease functioning as a member of the House of Representatives (that’s from the moment when an incumbent member of the House of Representatives is placed under a sentence of death, or is convicted of an elections offence, or is declared mentally ill or bankrupt); or if

5. The President makes him the Prime Minister (hmm! so there are situations where the Leader of the Opposition could be made Prime Minister; interesting!); or if

6. He is fired by the President because, while the House is not dissolved, the President feels, again, in his own judgement, that the incumbent Opposition Leader is no longer the member of the House who is best able to command the support of a majority (notice again, it does not say THE majority) of those members who aren’t supporting the Government.

I’ve searched the Constitution high and low, and it says nothing about somebody being appointed temporarily to act as or to perform the functions of Opposition Leader, unlike, as is the case for the President, Prime Minister and Ministers when they fall sick or go out the country etc. So once appointed the Leader of the Opposition remains Opposition Leader until there arises any of the above spelt out situations.

Another interesting prescription of our Constitution is that there is not even bound to be an Opposition Leader. Yes! That’s true!

For while, at Section 75 (1), the Constitution says: “There shall be of Cabinet for Trinidad and Tobago…” , and, at Section 75 (1), it says: “The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister etc...” meaning that, as is said in Trinidad and Tobago, “it bound to must have” a Cabinet and that “it bound to must have” a Prime Minister and so on, on the other hand, in respect of the Opposition Leader’s post, the Constitution talks a different language. Hear what it says in Section 83 (1):

“There shall be an office of the Leader of the Opposition…”

Did you pick up the difference? It doesn’t say, as it does for the Prime Minister, that “it bound to must have” an Opposition Leader you know, just that the office, in other words, “the post”, must exist!

If you think that my interpretation is incorrect, then read what Section 83 (6) says. That section spells out how legitimate Government business could go on where there is no Leader of the Opposition at all even where for such business to go on, the Constitution had stipulated that the Opposition Leader had to be consulted or had to give his advice.

Section 83 (6) without doubt was put in the Constitution because of what had happened after the 1971 General Elections: PNM had won all thirty-six (36) seats, so initially there wasn’t any member of the House in opposition, causing a real problem that was only solved when Point Fortin MP Richardson (Roy, not Selwyn) resigned from PNM, and the Governor-General promptly thereafter appointed him Opposition Leader! Do you remember that? (Some persons to this day swear that the whole episode was just a farcical ruse employed by the PNM-led government to forestall the calling of early elections.)

And who was the then Governor-General? Was it not Sir Ellis Clarke, the same man who led the team that wrote our present Constitution? So the team obviously did know what it was doing when it inserted Sections 83 (1) and (6).

Having said all this, I want every person who is making noise for Panday to move and for somebody else to be made Opposition Leader to carefully read over what Sections 83 (4) and (6) the Constitution say and contemplate the following:

What Sections 83 (4) and (6) forebode is that if the President wakes up in the morning and tells himself that Basdeo Panday no longer is best able to command the support of the majority of the opposition members, he will fire him. But when he fire him, if he feel there isn’t anybody who is best able to command such support, he is not bound to appoint any new Leader of the Opposition.

So all I could say in closing is that certain persons had better beware, because we could end not having any Opposition Leader at all.

God Bless Trinidad and Tobago.

Tobago's relationship with Trinidad.

2008-06-29T08:22:00.001-04:00

July 1st 2006.

During the debate over the new constitutional arrangements for Tobago, the late Dr. Eric Eustace Williams, then Prime Minister and Political Leader of the People’s National Movement said, “…Tobago exchanged British imperialism for Trinidadian imperialism.” In making that statement, he of course was describing the reality of the benefits that accrued to Tobago, subsequent to its being annexed to Trinidad in 1889, some one hundred and seventeen years ago.

And what is that reality?

It is one under which the peculiar geographical status of Tobago in the unitary state called Trinidad and Tobago is not recognised at all, except perhaps insofar as where the payments of emoluments to public servants in Tobago is concerned, that is, public servants who are Trinidadians posted in Tobago.

It is one in which Tobago is practically under the direct control of Trinidad, despite the fact that Tobago is geographically larger than most islands of the Caribbean (and, if one includes Tobago’s sub sea boundaries, bigger even than Trinidad!), and is blessed with natural resources which are more than adequate for its sustenance, resources which go beyond those of the internationally-projected image it being merely a holiday destination, one of sun, sand and sea.

It is one that has resulted in the almost total annihilation of the agricultural sector of Tobago, which, for decades before the advent of the PNM, had been the food basket of Trinidad and Tobago.

It is one where national policy has been that of control and use of the resources of Tobago by Trinidad for the benefit of Non-Tobagonians and where official records about Tobago and Tobagonians are kept in, and therefore, when needed, must be retrieved from, Trinidad.

It is one where, although it is purported that Trinidad and Tobago is a unitary state, because of the constitutional arrangements, a political party could lawfully be elected as the government of Trinidad and Tobago without even contesting a seat in Tobago, with that government then going on to impose its Trinicentric will on Tobago, by passing laws and implementing decisions directly affecting Tobago, without Tobago having the option to veto.

It is one where Tobago still has to come, cap in hand, to Trinidad and beg for funds for its House of Assembly recurrent and capital expenditure.

It is one where the very name, Trinidad and Tobago, suggests that Trinidad comes first in the relationship that exists between the two islands.

It is one, which, if the positions were reversed, Trinidadians would never accept.

It was hoped by all Tobagonians, and by many Trinidadians, that when the House of Assembly was being established, the result of that exercise would have been full self-government for Tobago, or, at the very least, full internal self-government. But, that was not to be. Having been trounced by the Democratic Action Congress, led by Arthur N. R. Robinson, (who had relinquished his seat in the House of Representatives to contest the Hose of Assembly elections), the PNM, stung by its being rejected by the people of Tobago, began a vindictive campaign aimed at frustrating the will of Tobago voters. Immediately, a Minister of Tobago Affairs was appointed, and given control over everything to do with Tobago. Cabinet (which is really to say, the government) refused to deal directly with the House of Assembly. Dr. Williams publicly derided the House of Assembly choice of name for its executive Heads of Departments, referring to the name “Secretary” as foreign, and therefore not acceptable in the Trinidad and Tobago context.

But, the House of Assembly stuck to its guns, and, over the years, has been able to make practical, albeit still insufficient, inroads into securing greater input by Tobago into national policy-making, especially insofar as such policy relates to Tobago. But, such inroads have been resultant mainly for two reasons:

1. The fact that between 1986 and 1991, the Prime Minister happened to be a Tobagonian, none other than Arthur N. R. Robinson, and

2. The fact that, since 2001 December, the same party that controlled the National Government also controlled the House of Assembly,

and not because of the amending of any existing constitutional arrangement.

So, it may be safely said that, at no time since the passage of the House of Assembly Act, has Tobago been ever allowed full control of its internal affairs, which, as stated before, is what all and sundry expected that such arrangement would have promulgated.

Where then do we go from here?

It is clear that a fresh look needs to be taken at the existing arrangements with the aim of putting in place the proper legislative frameworks for giving effect to the original intent of the House of Assembly Act. Hence my call for the rewriting of our Constitution to make Trinidad and Tobago a sovereign state that is a federation of the two islands.

Under such arrangement, in my view, each island would have its own Island Governing Council, headed by a Premier or a Chief Minister, and each would be fully responsible for its own internal affairs. There would also be a Federal Council, headed by an Executive President, which would be responsible for matters of national interest, such as international relations, monetary and fiscal policy, national defence, and so on.

In a later post I would expand in some more detail as to what I view ought to be the structural makeup of such federal government system.

The case for 100% State-funded education.

2008-06-29T08:19:00.000-04:00

September 7th 2006.

THE CASE FOR 100% STATE-FUNDED EDUCATIONAL PURSUITS.

No one would dare suggest that the State is wrong to risk spending billions of taxpayers’ dollars to locate, extract and refine valuable natural resources. Why? Because we understand, and accept, that there is a great profit to be made in the State so doing.

What, then, of the most valuable natural resource that any State could possess: meaning its human resource?

There can be no denying that its human resource is an important, if not, the primary natural resource of any State!

Ergo, there can be no denying that any State, which wishes to maximise/derive any profitable benefit from the existence/use of its human resource, must bear the full cost of educating (locating, extracting and refining) such resource!

Given the past, current and projected condition of financial capacity of this State called Trinidad and Tobago, as one of its thinking citizens, I demand that this State immediately amend/expand its fiscal policy to provide/guarantee full funding for every Trinbagonian citizen who is desirous of advancing his/her educational development, and in particular those who do not have the private means so to fund.

To ignore this my demand is tantamount to agreeing to continue consigning the best talent Trinidad and Tobago possesses to the dustbin or to being gobbled up by foreign interests.

God bless Trinidad and Tobago!

A senator cannot act or perform the duties of Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.

2008-06-29T08:08:00.002-04:00

Wednesday, 03 November 2005.

Can a Senator Lawfully Act For or Perform the Functions of Prime Minister?

Preface:

For several years, in several fora, I have been asking the captioned question. Inasmuch as no one has been able to convince me that it is possible, lawfully that is, for a Senator to perform the duties of Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, I decided to take some time out from my normally hectic schedule in order to find some satisfactory answer to the captioned enigma. This paper is the result of that search.

The captioned question is relevant because, while the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago which the President, under Section 37 (1), is sworn to preserve and defend, gives precise and pellucid instructions and guidelines with respect to the appointing of the Prime Minister of our Republic, yet, over the years, beginning from the era when the late Dr. Eric E. Williams was Prime Minister, one has observed that whenever an incumbent Prime Minister left Trinidad and Tobago, on many of those occasions the convention has been (as obtains at the instant of this writing) that the President appoints a member of the Senate to act as and or to perform the functions of Prime Minister.

I propose, in this treatise, to prove that convention to be completely ultra vires our Constitution, consequently rendering illegal any such appointment, and I hope so to prove by adequately answering the only germane question, which is:

“Is there any provision in our Constitution which so overrides or so amends Section 76 (1) and (3), that it would become lawful for the President, when Parliament is not dissolved, to appoint as Prime Minister a person who is not a member of the incumbent House of Representatives?”

Should my hypothesis be proven correct, I know that a modern-day Pandora’s Box would be opened, to which I say, so be it! Because ever I am guided by this Roman adage of old:

“Nos scimus quia lex bona est, modo quis ea utatur legitime!”

If, on the other hand, I am proven wrong, then I pray that, instead of being considered opprobrious by the more enlightened amongst us, this fruit of my research would be appreciated for what it is, it being, first and foremost, a positive, exegetic attempt by the author to boost our collective awareness of the implications of the provisions of our Constitution.

Findings and Interpretation of Findings:

My undertaking cannot begin without me here pointing out that, to me, the law is like a highway, which, when expertly designed and newly and properly built, lends itself to free, unhindered flow of traffic, as its surfaces would be smooth and its lane demarcation lines would be adequately wide apart and clearly visible, but, over time, because of the increase in the number and size of the vehicles that make up such traffic, the self same traffic that frequently traverses it, causes its surfaces to deteriorate, breaking up into gaping potholes and so on, slowing down, or even bringing all traffic to a complete halt. The only way one can prevent such a thoroughfare from falling into utter ruin is by ensuring that all such defects are expeditiously and expertly identified and corrected, and at whatever cost.

Our Constitution, being our supreme law, must be treated in the same manner.

Therefore, in answering the germane question, the first thing that needs to be settled is how our Constitution defines the term “appointment”, especially as it relates to the office of the Prime Minister.

To do that, one needs only to look at Section 3 (2), which states:

“In this Constitution:

a. a reference to an appointment to any office shall be construed (meaning: interpreted) as including a reference to the appointment of a person to act in or perform the functions of the office at any time when the office is vacant or the holder thereof is unable (whether by reason of absence or infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) to perform the functions of that office; and

b. a reference to the holder of any office by the term designating his office shall be construed (interpreted) as including a reference to any person for the time being lawfully acting in OR performing the functions of that office.”

In other words, every time our Constitution talks about appointing a person to an office, any office, it is also talking about the appointing of a person to act for and or to perform the functions of some other person who is or was the substantive holder of such office, and every time our Constitution refers to any office by name, it is also referring to any person who is acting in such office or who is performing the functions of such office.

Please note:

· that there can be no dispute that the position of Prime Minister IS an office, and

· that Section 3 (2) specifies- “…SHALL BE construed…”, and

· that nowhere in Section 3 (2) is it said: “…where the context so admits or so allows…”, or, “…subject to Section…”, or, “…unless…” or any similar conditional expression. (In fact, the only place in the whole of Section 3 that one finds some conditional expression is with regard to the definition of the word “House”, where it uses the expression “as the context may require”; but I shall revert to that definition later on in this piece.), and

· that, as far as the office of the Prime Minister is concerned, nowhere else in our Constitution is there to be found anything to override the said Section 3 (2).

So, since there is no leeway given to interpret otherwise, in the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the word “appointment” must always be interpreted in the manner that is spelt out in the said Section 3 (2).

There is a very good example of our Constitution endorsing my just stated view where, at Section 24 (2) it provides as follows:

“Except in the case of a person acting as, or performing the functions of President under section 27, but subject to sections 44(2) and 50(8), the President shall not hold any other office of emolument or profit whether in the public service or otherwise. (The implication of the underlined words is the person, whilst acting as or performing the functions of President, is the President, which is in sync with Section 3 (2)).”

Flowing therefrom, there can be no denying that the same eligibility qualifications as are applicable to someone who is to be substantively appointed to the office of Prime Minister would also be applicable to someone who is to be put to act in, or to temporarily perform the functions of, that office, unless the Constitution expressly otherwise provides. That, in a nutshell, sums up the main underpinning upon which this my dissertation is based.

Now, there can only be two backdrops against which a Prime Minister can be appointed:

1. Parliament is not dissolved; or

2. Parliament is dissolved.

Although, from time to time, I shall refer to the constitutional provisions governing the appointment of a Prime Minister when Parliament is in dissolution, be reminded at all times that the focal point of this study lies with the first of the abovementioned backdrops, that is, where Parliament is not in dissolution.

Permit me at this time to identify and review the three mandatory, intrinsic eligibility qualifications constitutionally required of any person who, once Parliament is not dissolved, is to be appointed as Prime Minister (which, by operations of Section 3 (2), includes every person who is to be appointed to act as and or to perform the functions of an incumbent Prime Minister).

1. He must be an incumbent and functioning member of the House of Representatives; and

2. He must have undisputable command of the support of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives or, if not, then, in the President’s absolute judgement, the best likelihood of so being able to command; and

3. He must be willing to be appointed as Prime Minister.

Those three warps are the only ones that I will use as I weave this tapestry which, when finished, will reveal why my proposition is correct.

It is obvious, when reviewing the above three criteria, that functioning membership in the House of Representatives is the prime consideration (no pun intended).

I cannot be accused of uttering hyperboles, since what I just said is a mere condensation of what is unequivocally spelt out in Section 76 (1) of our Constitution, where it is stated:

“Where there is occasion for the appointment of a Prime Minister, the President SHALL appoint as Prime Minister:

a. a member of the House of Representatives who is the Leader in that House of the party which commands the support of the majority of members of that House; OR

b. where it appears to him that that party does not have an undisputed leader in that House or that no party commands the support of such a majority, the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is most likely to command the support of the majority of members of that House;

and who is willing to accept the office of Prime Minister.”

The discerning amongst us at once will ask, “In the context of Section 76 (1), does the term ‘Prime Minister’ also refer to a person acting as or performing the functions of Prime Minister?” Obviously, the answer to that question is yes. Because Section 3 (2) of our Constitution says so, and that section countenances no amelioration due to contextual couching of its therein contained definition of the expression “Prime Minister”, none whatsoever! In fact, in all of Section 3 (2), of the expressions therein defined, there is only one instance where permission is granted for contextual interpretation, but I will subsequently revert to that case.

The next incisive question that would be asked is, “But who is this ‘Leader’ to whom Section 76 (1) refers?”

This “Leader” is a constitutionally-created office, about the appointment of which I will not go into detail at this juncture, but will instead highlight that Section 3 (2) also applies to such “Leader”, which means that such “Leader”, as referred to in Section 76 (1), includes any person who is temporarily acting as or performing the functions of such “Leader” when such “Leader” is unable for whatever reason, to perform the functions related to such position, whatever such functions may be. The full import of what I have just said will impact upon the reader as I proceed, that is, if it has not already so impacted.

The still sceptical amongst us then might scoff, “But surely, Section 76 (1) refers only to the moment right after the General Election results are declared or the resignation or the demise of an incumbent Prime Minister or some similar occasion?” My answer would be, “Bring your proof! For I of myself can find no such proof in our Constitution. If the Constitution intended that to be the case, Section 76 (1) would have used language similar to what is found at Section 83 (3) (c) to wit:

“…when the House of Representatives first meets after dissolution of Parliament.”

Besides, if one were to go along with the suggestion that 76 (1) only refers to right after the results of the General elections are certified, then one would be interpreting the term “Prime Minister” in a different light to that which Section 3 (2) prescribes.

The ever-present issue of concern here is that under our system, apart from the period when a Parliament stands dissolved, it is impossible for Cabinet to flourish unless the majority of the members of the House of Representatives continuously support it. And the member of the House of Representatives who demonstrably controls such support, or if there is no such person, the member of the House of Representatives whom the President, and the President alone, feels is best able to control such support, on every occasion is appointed Prime Minister; on every occasion, even, as I shall later prove, after Parliament is dissolved, because, in a certain circumstance, a dissolved Parliament can be reconvened before General elections take place.

That is why the enabling part of Section 76 (1) says:

“Where there is occasion for the appointment of a Prime Minister, the President SHALL appoint as Prime Minister…,”

And if there is no occasion so to do, a Prime Minister, lawfully, cannot be appointed.

Just what anyway, are the occasions that catalyse the need for the appointing of a Prime Minister? They are:

1. Where the Prime Minister’s office is vacant, and

2. Where the Prime Minister, for whatever reason, is incapable of performing the functions of his office.

Section 77 of our Constitution gives the circumstances that would cause the Prime Minister’s office to become vacant, but the dissolution of Parliament is not one of those reasons. Section 77 states:

1. “Where the House of Representatives passes a resolution, supported by the votes of a majority of all the members of the House, declaring that it has no confidence in the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister does not within seven days of the passing of such resolution either resign or advise the President to dissolve Parliament, the President shall revoke the appointment of the Prime Minister.

2. The Prime Minister shall also vacate his office:

a. when after any dissolution of Parliament he is informed by the President that the President is about to re-appoint him as Prime Minister or to appoint another person as Prime Minister; or

b. where for any reason other than a dissolution of Parliament he ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives.”

Section 142 outlines another circumstance that would without question cause the Prime Minister’s office to become vacant. This is what Section 142 says:

1. “Subject to the provision of this Constitution, any person who is appointed or elected to or otherwise selected for any office established by this Constitution, including the office of Prime Minister or other Ministers, or Parliamentary Secretary, may resign from that office by writing under his hand addressed to the person or authority by whom he was appointed, elected or selected,

2. The resignation of any person from any such office shall take effect when the writing signifying the resignation is received by the person or authority to whom it is addressed or by any person authorised by that person or authority to receive it.”

And I put forward that another circumstance would be when, as occurred sometime towards the end of March 1981, the incumbent Prime Minister dies in office. It is very odd that our Constitution makes no mention whatsoever of this most obvious circumstance, an omission that provides the uninitiated with sufficient room to conjecture that one’s tenure of Prime Ministerial office continues even after one passes beyond death’s threshold!

Given that the enabling part of Section 76 (1) does not discriminate in its description of the occasion, it therefore means that, on any and every occasion that the need arises for a person to be appointed as Prime Minister, whatever prescription it mandates must be adhered to, without deviation; unless of course there be some constitutional proviso or provision which clearly overrides that mandate. I make bold to say that, other than Section 76 (4), our Constitution contains no proviso or provision like that, none whatsoever!

Indeed, if one should read the Constitution the way it should be read, taken as a whole and not in bits and pieces, then the views I am expressing herein would be very easy to understand and to accept.

Every section, or subsection, of the Constitution which talks about appointment of a Prime Minister (which includes a person to act as or perform the functions of), other than Section 76 (1) and (4), therefore has to maintain, as it were, a pas de deux with Sections 3 (2) and 76 (1). Otherwise, conflicts arise.

If I were to rewrite Section 76 (1) as follows, would it be saying something entirely or fundamentally different to what our Constitution actually says?

“Where there is occasion for the President to appoint a Prime Minister, no person shall be so appointed unless the President is satisfied that such person is a member of the House of Representatives:

1. who is the Leader in that House of the party which commands the support of the majority of members of that House;

but where it appears to the President that that party does not have an undisputed leader in that House or that no party commands the support of such a majority, the member of the House of Representatives

2. who, in the President’s judgment, is most likely to command the support of the majority of members of that House;

providing always that such person is willing to accept the office of Prime Minister.”

That style is similar to that used in Section 105 which states:

“A person shall not be appointed as a Judge or to act as a Judge unless he has such qualifications for appointment as may be prescribed.”

Having due regard to what to the ultima ut ante quoted section of our Constitution prescribes, can one contemplate any person being lawfully appointed to perform the functions of a Judge who does not have those qualifications?

One cannot? So, how can one countenance the ignoring of the constitutionally prescribed qualifications for the post of Prime Minister, which has been occurring with such regularity and impunity?

But, before I go further, I must ask what is the meaning of the expression “party”, as mentioned in Section 76 (1). Since it is not defined in Section 3, or anywhere else, one shall have to interpret what it means from the context in which it appears.

While most analysts interpret the word “party”, as used in that section, to mean “political party”, I do not concur. Please let me explain.

The term “party”, either in its singular or plural form, shows up thirteen (is there some significance in that number?) times in our Constitution.

On the first instance, it is mentioned in the context of matters relating to the fundamental human rights and freedoms as follows:

“Section (4) It is hereby recognised and declared that in Trinidad and Tobago there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, origin, colour, religion or sex, the following fundamental human rights and freedoms, namely:

(e) the right to join political parties and to express political views;”

I might mention that Section 4 (e) is the only place in the Constitution where the word “political” appears. For that matter, the word “politics” or any derivative of the word “politics” appears nowhere else in our Constitution. Imagine that! Just twice in a Constitution, which contains more than 32,500 words! The significance of that bit of trivia, to me, is not trivial! (On a humorous note, maybe, in doing that, the Constitution is sending a subliminal message that citizens of Trinidad and Tobago must avoid politics in order to enjoy success their affairs!)

On the next three instances, it is mentioned in the context of matters relating to court actions as follows:

“Section 5 (2) Without prejudice to subsection (1), but subject to this Chapter and to section 54, Parliament may not: …

(g) deprive a person of the right to the assistance of an interpreter in any proceedings in which he is involved or in which he is a party or a witness, before a court, commission, board or other tribunal, if he does not understand or speak English;…

Section 14 (4) Where in any proceedings in any court other than the High Court or the Court of Appeal any question arises as to the contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter the person presiding in that court may, and shall if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the High Court unless in his opinion the raising of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious.

Section 38(4) The condition referred to in subsection (3) is that two months must elapse after a notice in writing has been served on him either by registered post or by being left at his office stating the nature of the proceedings, the cause of action, the name, description and address of the party instituting the proceedings and the relief claimed.”

On the fifth and sixth occasions, it is mentioned in the context of a member having to vacate his seat in the House of Representatives, as follows:

“Section 49 (2) (e) having been the candidate of a party and elected to the House, he resigns from or is expelled by that party.”

On the seventh, eighth and ninth occasions, it is mentioned in the context of directives regarding the process to be followed after the circumstances described in Section 49 (2) (e) arise, as follows:

“Section 49A (1) Where circumstances such as are referred to in section 49 (2) (e) arise, the leader in the House of Representatives of the party as a candidate of which the member was elected, shall so inform the Speaker in writing of those circumstances and the Speaker shall, at the sitting of the House of Representatives next after he is so informed, make a declaration that the member has resigned from or has been expelled by the party, as the case may be.

Section 49A (5) Standing Orders shall make provision for the identification and recognition of the leader in the House of Representatives of every party and for otherwise giving effect to this section.”

On the tenth, eleventh and twelfth occasions, it is mentioned in the context of directives regarding the appointment of a Prime Minister, as follows:

“Section 76 (1) Where there is occasion for the appointment of a Prime Minister, the President shall appoint as Prime Minister:

(a) a member of the House of Representatives who is the Leader in that House of the party which commands the support of the majority of members of that House; or

(b) where it appears to him that party does not have an undisputed leader in that House or that no party commands the support of such a majority, the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is most likely to command the support of the majority of members of that House.”

And, on the thirteenth and final occasion, it is again mentioned in the context of matters relating to court actions as follows:

“Section 109 (5) Subject to this section, provision may be made by or under any Act regulating the procedure to be adopted by the Court of Appeal with respect to any appeal to the Judicial Committee under this section or by parties to any such appeal.”

In arriving of my below interpretations of the terms “party” and “parties” as it appears in the Constitution, I also took careful note of the manner in which Section 83 (2) and (4) is drafted, as follows:

“Section 83 (2) The President shall, if the person concerned is willing to be appointed, appoint as Leader of the Opposition the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment is best able to command the support of the greatest number of members of the House of Representatives who do not support the Government.

Section 83 (4) Where in the judgment of the President, the Leader of the Opposition is no longer the member of the House of Representatives best able to command the support of a majority of those members of the House of Representatives who do not support the Government, the President shall revoke the appointment of the Leader of the Opposition.”

Nowhere in Section 83 is to be found the word “party”.

There can be no question that, because of the context in which it used, the term “parties”, as mentioned in Section 4 (e), there means “persons or groups of persons working together in furtherance of some political end”.

There can be no question that, because of the context in which it used, the terms “party” and “parties”, as mentioned in Sections 5 (2) (g), 14 (4), 38 (4) and 109 (5), there refer to the person or persons involved in or concerned with some court action.

There can be no question that, because of the context in which it used, the term “party”, as mentioned in Sections 49 (2) (e), 49A (1) and (5) there means:

“group comprising persons who together are working or have worked to have some person or persons, whether of their group or not, elected to the House of Representatives.”

In this particular instance, the group cannot be defined as a political party in the popular meaning of the word, or as defined in the Representation of the People Act, since the person or persons that the group is trying to have elected to the House of Representatives could be “independent” candidates.

I must also remark that Sections 49 (2) (e) and 49A would be unworkable where there is only one such successful candidate.

With respect to the term “party”, as mentioned three times in Section 76 (1), as far as I am concerned, there can be no question that, again because of the context in which it used, that term there means:

“group, comprising incumbent members of the House of Representatives whom, because of their whatever history, the President expects to be always collaborating with and supportive of each other in furtherance of their activities as members of that House, especially with regard to how they shall vote in that House when any such vote is required of them.”

Such an interpretation of Section 76, in the context of the entire Constitution, is the only interpretation, I daresay, that would make sense, and, if accepted, would at once resolve the conundrum, as has been in the past caused, when a Member of Parliament “crosses” the floor.

Once there is such a group (the Constitution says “party”) in the House of Representatives, which commands the support of the majority of members of that House, it would be foolhardy of that group to not have a leader; for after all, such leader would be invited by the President to accept the post of Prime Minister, which, debatably, is the most powerful office in the Republic.

In any event, to misinterpret the term “party”, as it appears in Section 76, to mean “political party”, would be to say that, under Subsection (1) (a),only members of political parties can be appointed as Prime Minister and that, under the whole of Section 76 (1), the first quality that the President is required to look for in any Prime Ministerial prospect is membership of a political party; or, in other words, members of the House of Representatives who are members of a political party would be given preferential treatment over other members of the House of Representatives when it comes to their being given the opportunity to be appointed as Prime Minister.

I’m afraid that such behaviour would be contrary to Section (4) of the Constitution.

But what if there is no leader of that group in the House of Representatives, as Section 76 (1) (a) requires? Fortunately, the Constitution, in its wisdom, caters for the “what if?” scenario.

Let’s take a second look at how Section 76 (1) (b) is worded:

“where it appears to him that that party does not have an undisputed leader IN THAT HOUSE or that no party commands the support of such a majority, the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is most likely to command the support of the majority of members of that House;”

Surely, the wording of Section 76 (1) (b) was not constructed and or inserted in an arbitrary and or careless manner. Au contraire! In my view, Section 76 (1) (b) was contrived to give, among other things, specific directives to the President of Trinidad and Tobago as to how he is to proceed in the appointing of a Prime Minister, in the event where the leader of the group that commands the support of the majority in the House of Representatives is in some other place beside that House, for example:

a. such leader might be a member of the Senate, or,

b. he might have been a member of The House of Representatives but, as Section 49 prescribes, was forced to vacate his seat, or

c. he might be outside Parliament altogether because, in the first place, he was not even there, or

d. he is lawfully debarred from performing his functions as a member of the House of Representatives, or

e. he may be prevented from performing his functions as such leader for whatever cause, as prescribed by Section 3 (2).

But, in the history of the eight Parliaments of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago since Section 49A (5) was made law, there has never been, bar one, any occasion where there has not been an easily identifiable member of the House of Representatives to fit the bill of “Leader” in the manner described in Section 76 (1) (a). One may wish to call to mind the debacle which arose after the 2001 General Election.

Yet the House of Representatives has continuously refused to comply with the directives given to it by the Constitution, where by Section 49A (5), that House is required through its Standing Orders to make the necessary provisions so as to enable such “Leader” to be clearly identified. As a consequence, there is strong case for arguing that the President has always been using Section 76 (1) (b) to appoint a Prime Minister when the position of Prime Minister is vacant, and he certainly did so when the occasion arose upon the death of Dr. Eric E. Williams.

One can also argue, with good justification, that, where a Prime Minister is appointed under the provisions of Section 76 (1) (b), and such Prime Minister goes on to demonstrate that he does in fact have the support of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives, he becomes the de facto, if not the de jure, “Leader”, as defined in Section 76 (1) (a).

What must also be noted is the similarity in language between Section 76 (1) and 3 (2): both sections use the expression “shall”. In matters analogous to what is being herein discussed, that expression ordinarily implies that under no circumstances must there be a deviation from what is thereafter stipulated, since, as shall be supra explained the term “shall” imposes a duty upon the person to whom such term actively refers.

There can be no gainsaying that such implications would have been entirely different if Sections 76 (1) and or 3 (2) and or some other section had mentioned some excepting proviso, or some provision stipulating circumstances under which the President shall or may appoint, as Prime Minister, somebody other than a Member of the House of Representatives. An excellent example of the type of proviso of which I speak is to be found in Section 47, where it is stated:

“Subject to the provisions of section 48, a person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of the House of Representatives if, and shall not be qualified to be so elected unless, he-

a. is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago of the age of eighteen years or upwards, and

b. has resided in Trinidad and Tobago for a period of two years immediately before the date of his nomination for election or is domiciled and resident in Trinidad and Tobago at that date.”

What, I ask, would have been the meaning and the consequences of Section 47, if, on the other hand, its wording was as follows:

“A person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of the House of Representatives if he-

c. is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago of the age of eighteen years or upwards, and

d. has resided in Trinidad and Tobago for a period of two years immediately before the date of his nomination for election or is domiciled and resident in Trinidad and Tobago at that date.”

It should be easy to get my drift, not so?

Next, I will refer to Section 76 (3). This is a key section in the whole mix. Listen to what it says:

“The Ministers, other than the Prime Minister, shall be such persons as the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, shall appoint from among the members of the House of Representatives and the Senators.”

Is there any need for me to comment on Section 76 (3)? Not right now, so I’ll let it soak in a bit.

Thus far, I have reviewed three complementary sections of our Constitution, sections, which, combined mandate that once Parliament is not in dissolution:

· The Prime Minister has to come from the House of Representatives, and

· The other Ministers can come from either the Senate or the House of Representatives.

Continued review of our Constitution verifies that the essence of those three sections is never contradicted, because on every single occasion where the Constitution identifies the House from which the Prime Minister must come, it is careful to use the expression- “House of Representatives”.

It never says- “Senate”.

And it never just says- “House”.

For if it ever just said “House”, then, due to the manner in which the word “House” is defined at Section 3 (1) of our Constitution, the expression “House” could be interpreted to mean either “the House of Representatives” or “the Senate”, according to the context.

Yet again, every time the Constitution expressly or impliedly speaks of the person who is the Prime Minister having to vacate his seat in Parliament, or having to cease performing his functions as a Member of Parliament, the chamber that it identifies is, yes, that’s correct, the House of Representatives.

And furthermore, nowhere in the Constitution is it expressly or impliedly pronounced that the person who is Prime Minister can come from the Senate, or can depart from the Senate.

Nowhere!

Not even in the much-vaunted Section 78!

Indeed, this is what Section 78 states:

1. Where the Prime Minister is absent from Trinidad and Tobago or is unable by reason of illness or of the provisions of section 77(4) to perform the functions conferred on him by this Constitution, the President MAY authorise some other member of the Cabinet to perform those functions, other than the functions conferred by subsection (2), and that member may perform those functions until his authority is revoked by the President.

2. The powers of the President under this section shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, save that where the President considers that it is impracticable to obtain the advice of the Prime Minister owing to his absence or illness, or where the Prime Minister is unable to tender advice by reason of the provisions of section 77(4) the President may exercise those powers without the advice of the Prime Minister.

Is there anything in Section 78 that overrides Section 76 (1) or 76 (3)? And if there is, what part of Section 76 (1) does it override?

a. Does it override that part that states that the Prime Minister shall be appointed from amongst the members of the House of Representatives?

I say that it does not, because neither it nor Section 76 (1) contains any expression, which says that Section 78, whether in whole or in part, sets aside anything in Section 76 (1) or makes Section 76 (1) subject to Section 78.

b. Does it override that part that states that the Prime Minister must be either the member of the House of Representatives who is leader of the party which, in that House, commands the support of the majority of such members, or the member best able so to do if there is no such leader in that House?

Again, and for the same reason I gave in support of my answer to question a. above, it does not.

c. Does it override that part that states that the person whom the President has in mind to appoint as Prime Minister must be willing to accept the position?

No, of course not! For if it so did, then, in addition to the above reasons, it would be contravening the provisions of Section 4 of our Constitution.

But the answer would be yes, if one were to agree that there is no nexus between Section 78 and other parts of the Constitution, principally Section 3 (2) and 76 (1), which would mean that the President may appoint a Minister against his will.

d. Does the expression “may” in Section 78 (1) override the expression “shall” in Section 76 (1)?

At the risk of sounding facetious, unless it is annexed to some empowering conditional phrase or clause, the term “may” may not. (I will discuss “may” in more detail at a later place in this document).

e. Well then, since it does none of the above, does it override the whole of Section 76 (1)?

Obviously, it does not! And I do not think that I have to proffer any reason for so answering!

And what part of Section 76 (3) does it override?

f. Does the expression, “some other member of the Cabinet”, in Section 78 (1), override the expression, “other than the Prime Minister”, in Section 76 (3)?

Again, for the reasons I have ante given, my answer is no! And, even if Section 78 (2) gives power to Prime Minister to select the member of Cabinet who is to hold on for him, in selecting such member, the Prime Minister is fettered by 76 (3). Again, I have to point out that according to Section 3 (2), the expression “Prime Minister” in Section 76 (3) also refers to the person performing the functions of the Prime Minister.

Well then, exactly what does Section 78 do?

g. Does Section 78 bestow any power on the President, which, without Section 78, he would not have? If so, what power? That he could appoint a Minister other than the Prime Minister to perform certain Prime Ministerial functions?

Well, if that is the case, what then is the meaning of Section 3 (2) and 76 (1)? Doesn’t the President, because of Sections 3 (2) and 76 (1), already have the power to appoint someone (which, obviously, would include a Minister) to perform the functions of Prime Minister when for whatever reason the Prime Minister cannot so perform? Of course he does!

Those very arguments also apply in respect of the President’s power to revoke the appointment, which Section 78 (1) also purports to give him.

So any idea as enunciated by Section 80 (3) (b) that Section 78 confers any power at all to the President is at best a fatuous one, since a person cannot be imbued with a power that he already lawfully possesses.

As a matter of fact, there is, in my view, a strong case for declaring 78 and every section that is tangential to it null and void and of no effect for it purports to confer on the President powers that, by dint of Sections 3 (2) and 76 (1) and (4) he already lawfully has, which powers, by dint of Section 80 (3) (a), he is required to exercise in his own deliberate judgement. This is what Section 80 (3) (a) says:

“Without prejudice to any other case in which the President is authorised or required to act in his discretion, the President SHALL ACT in accordance with his own deliberate judgment in the performance of the following functions-

a. in the exercise of the power to appoint the Prime Minister conferred upon him by section 76(1) or (4);”

Those two Sections, 76 (1) and (4), comprehensively cover the procedure for the appointing of a Prime Minister (which includes persons acting as and or temporarily performing the duties of) both when Parliament is not dissolved and when it is in dissolution.

Bearing in mind that the provisions of the Constitution, jointly and severally, do different things such as:

a. Confer powers and or,

b. Give permission and or,

c. Bestow freedoms and or,

d. Create rights and or,

e. Impose restrictions and or,

f. Impose duties on some person and or,

g. Create offices or statutory bodies and or,

h. Outline procedures to be followed and or,

i. Interpret expressions and or,

j. Amend, vary, impose conditions on, or repeal other provisions or other laws,

one shall therefore have to re-examine Section 78 to see how it operates, for instance, whether, instead of giving the President new powers, it does the exact opposite, which is, it takes away or diminishes some of his elsewhere bestowed powers.

Section 78 (1) uses the expression “may authorise” and not the expression “may only authorise” or “shall authorise”. In so using, Section 78 (1) has to be interpreted as merely giving permission to the President to ignore the Ministerial status of the prospective appointee where such prospect already is a member of Cabinet.

But, according to Section 76 (1), Ministerial status is not a criterion for selecting a Prime Minister, as, by using the term “shall”, the President is commanded to appoint a member of the House of Representatives. In other words, a duty, which he cannot shirk, is placed on his shoulders, but which, if he does shirk, leaves the validity of such appointment open to being questioned in a court of law.

So what’s the point of 78 (1) then? And how can it be reconciled with Section 76 (3)?

Earlier on, I had alluded to the fact that because the term “may”, used in Section 78 (1), was not annexed to some empowering conditional phrase or clause, Section 78 (1) cannot be said to override the stipulations of Section 76 (1). Examples of such conditional phrases or clauses are to be found at Section 14 (4) which states:

“Where in any proceedings in any court other than the High Court or the Court of Appeal any question arises as to the contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter the person presiding in that court may, and shall if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the high court unless in his opinion the raising of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious.”

So, if we were to use the style of Section 14 (4) as a guide, the existing constitutional provisions governing the appointing of someone to perform the functions of Prime Minister would be described as follows:

“Where, in the circumstances described in Section 78, permission is granted to the President to appoint some other member of Cabinet to perform the functions of an incapacitated, substantive Prime Minister, such other member of Cabinet, shall not be eligible to be so appointed unless he be:

a. where the substantive Prime Minister is the Leader in the House of Representatives of the group which commands the support of the majority of members of that House, the member of that House who, in such circumstances, is acting for and or performing the functions of such Leader in that House; or

b. where the substantive Prime Minister, for whatever reason, is not undisputedly such Leader in that House, the member of the House of Representatives who, in the President’s judgment, is next most likely to command the support of the majority of members of that House;

and who is willing to accept such appointment.”

Recalling my earlier comments on the term “may”, let me here emphatically re-state that “may” when used alone conveys no intention of compulsion, rather it suggests that who ever “may”, has a choice. I proffer the just-quoted Section 14 (4) in conclusive support of that argument.

Given the way Section 78 is framed, the word “may”, in Subsection (1) must include in its meaning “or may not if he so desires”. So the question arises as to whether its Subsection (2) compels the President to appoint the member of the Cabinet, whom the incumbent Prime Minister so advises him to do in the circumstances that Section 78 (1) purports to allow.

I say, no! Because it is not for the incumbent Prime Minister to decide whether a member of the Cabinet is to be appointed to perform Prime Ministerial duties, it is the President who so decides. That is what Section 78 (1) says. Let’s read it again:

Something has just struck me about the implications of the way the above subsection is drafted. But let’s read on to Section 78 (2), I’ll deal with that thunderbolt in a while.

Aha! Now one can see powers being conferred on somebody, and that somebody is none other than the Prime Minister, that is, the incumbent Prime Minister. He is the one who Section 78 (2) says must pick out the Minister who will hold on for him, not the President, to whom that power was given at Section 76 (1), and reinforced at Section 80 (3) (a). And, although in closing, Section 78 does restore that power to the President in situations when it is impracticable for the Prime Minister to give such advice to him, by so interfering with the President’s aforesaid powers, Section 78 (2) brings itself into direct conflict with Section 76 (1) and (4), Section 80 (3) (a) and Section 3 (2).

I put forward that, in the absence of empowering conditional expressions in any of those sections, expressions, the effect of which would have given Section 78 the ascendancy over the others, Section 78 cannot be said to dilute, and, in fact, does not dilute, any power of the President to act in his exclusive deliberate judgement in determining who is to be appointed Prime Minister on any occasion.

Now to the thunderbolt.

Assuming now that I concede that Section 78 is properly ensconced in our Constitution, the only situation in which Section 78 (2) would be applicable is when the Prime Minister is absent from Trinidad and Tobago. Why? Because, if, as stipulated in Section 78 (1), the Prime Minister is unable to perform his constitutionally-conferred functions, one of which is to advise the President under Section 78 (2), how in the world would it be possible for him to advise the President, except where the Prime Minister is in good health and either present in or absent from Trinidad and Tobago? Notice, 78 (2) did not say, “save that where the Prime Minister is unable by reason of…” it said, “save that where the President finds it impracticable to obtain the advice of…”

Further, if Section 78 is valid, then the Prime Minister’s is the only office where the incumbent decides who will performs his functions in his absence! With every other office, somebody other than the incumbent makes that decision. Such a scenario leaves open the opportunity for a chilling turn of events, which I shall supra describe.

A next area of major concern is whether mere absence from Trinidad and Tobago necessitates the appointment of someone to perform Prime Ministerial functions. To me the way Section 78 is worded, it does not. Let me describe the sequence of events, as they must take place, in order for someone to be so appointed.

What triggers that sequence is the action of the Prime Minister deciding that someone should hold on for him in his absence from Trinidad and Tobago. It is at that point the Prime Minister would inform the President of such need. The ball would then be in the President’s court, for it is the President who will decide whether that someone will be chosen from Cabinet or not. If the President does decide to select someone from the Cabinet, then, and only then can the Prime Minister’s advice be given as provided by Section 78 (2). That, I’m afraid, is all what Section 78 stipulates, because nothing in Section 78 (1) makes it mandatory for a Minister to be appointed.

But what if, despite his absence from Trinidad and Tobago, the Prime Minister is still able to perform his functions? In such circumstances, exactly what functions would the person appointed to perform his functions actually perform? I ask this because, again according to Section 78 (1), his mere absence from Trinidad and Tobago is, in and of itself, sufficient cause to warrant the Prime Minister advising the President to appoint some person to perform the Prime Ministerial functions.

In that light, Section 78 can be said to be re-interpreting Section 3 (2) (a), since the latter section defines “appointment” to mean, inter alia, insofar as the office of the Prime Minister is concerned, “appointment of somebody to temporarily perform the functions of an office when the holder of such office is unable to perform because of his absence or whatever cause”, while former section comes along and removes the inability to perform requirement in respect of absence from Trinidad and Tobago, thereby creating a new definition as follows:

“In this Constitution:

a. a reference to an appointment TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER shall be construed (meaning: interpreted) as including a reference to the appointment of a person to act in or perform the functions of the office at any time when the office is vacant or the holder thereof is absent from Trinidad and Tobago or is unable (whether by reason of illness or of the provisions of Section 77 (4)) to perform the functions of that office;…”

Section 78 (1) also purports to give the President permission to appoint “SOME other member of the Cabinet”. The use of the word, “some”, is very intriguing. Why, for instance, did not the framers of our Constitution instead use the word “ANY”?

There can be no denying that the word “any”, if used, in this context, instead of “some”, would have meant that the selectee could be chosen at random, without a single thought given as to whether he met the qualifications for the job as are stipulated elsewhere in the Constitution. But, by specifying “some”, it means that the selector has to exercise care to ensure that the selectee satisfies all the criteria as are necessary to make him eligible. (That is something that I learnt since I was a little boy in Teacher Merle’s (Merle Look Loy) class at Arouca Boys’ R.C. School.)

And in so exercising, the selector, if he did not already know them, would find those criteria in Section 76 (1), not in Section 78 (1).

I further venture that the framers of our Constitution also shied away from using the expression “any” and deliberately used “some” because they realised that if they so did, it would have caused Section 78 to be in conflict with Section 76 (1) and 76 (3).

I wish to reinforce that last point by directing the reader to all the Sections that deal with the appointment of Ministers other than the Prime Minister, and especially to Section 76 (2). Does the reader believe that it is constitutionally possible for a Member of Parliament who is not an attorney to be appointed Attorney-General?

In the face of that then, would one say that, in all such Sections, where power is bestowed on the President to appoint a Minister other than the Prime Minister, that, where such Minister is the Attorney-General, a non-attorney could be appointed?

If the honest and unhesitating answer is no, then, how is it possible, where the Constitution, by operations of Sections 3 (2) 76 (1) and 76 (3), expressly lays out the qualifications that any person who is to be Prime Minister must have, that one can countenance the appointing of a Senatorial Prime Minister?

Once one agrees with my last point, then one must agree that Section 78 (1), as written, can only be interpreted in one way, which I shall later describe, especially in the face of the fact that, nowhere in the Constitution is it expressly stipulated that only an attorney can be appointed as Attorney-General.

Now, given that, in order to become a member of Cabinet, other than the Prime Minister, a person firstly must be a member either of The House of Representatives or of the Senate, would it be okay for us to insert in Section 78 (1) the expression “a member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate who is” to make that section read as follows:

“Where the Prime Minister is absent from Trinidad and Tobago or is unable by reason of illness or of the provisions of section 77(4) to perform the functions conferred on him by this Constitution, the President MAY authorise a member of the House of Representatives OR OF THE SENATE who is some other member of the Cabinet to perform those functions, other than the functions conferred by subsection (2), and that member may perform those functions until his authority is revoked by the President.”

Is the above saying the same thing as what Section 78 (1) actually says, which is:

“Where the Prime Minister is absent from Trinidad and Tobago or is unable by reason of illness or of the provisions of section 77(4) to perform the functions conferred on him by this Constitution, the President MAY authorise some other member of the Cabinet to perform those functions, other than the functions conferred by subsection (2), and that member may perform those functions until his authority is revoked by the President.”

Or wouldn’t one agree with me that the insertion of those apparently innocuous words fundamentally alters the meaning of Section 78 (1) because, in the former example, those words automatically purport to vary Section 3 (2) and Section 76 (1) and (3), while it is obvious that in the latter example, there is nothing that so purports?

Doesn’t all that I thus far have written strongly suggest something to the reader?

Doesn’t is all strongly suggest that, once Parliament is not dissolved, the Prime Minister (which, as defined by our Constitution includes the acting Prime Minister, or somebody performing the functions of the Prime Minister) has to be a member of the House of Representatives?

Doesn’t it also strongly suggest to the reader that Section 78 can be nothing more than an addendum to Section 76, serving purposes some of which already I have mentioned and some others that I shall later on mention?

For the life of me then, I cannot fathom how else Section 78 (1) can be interpreted except as follows:

1. That it makes it clear that, in the circumstances described in Section 78 (1), an incumbent Minister, WHO IS NOT the incumbent Prime Minister, cannot be debarred from being appointed to perform the functions of Prime Minister on the grounds that he is already a Minister of Cabinet, PROVIDING ALWAYS that he meets all eligibility criteria for being appointed to the Prime Ministerial post as are set out elsewhere in the Constitution; AND OR

2. That it stipulates an ADDITIONAL PRE-QUALIFICATION that such a person MUST HAVE in order for the President to consider him eligible so to be authorised, which is, that such person has to be an incumbent Minister OTHER THAN the incumbent Prime Minister.

Or, to put it another way, Section 78 (1) simply states the obvious, since, when the incumbent Prime Minister is absent from Trinidad and Tobago or is unable to function for whatever reason, he is no longer on the scene, so it is only logical that a person, OTHER than the Prime Minister, has to fill in for the Prime Minister which is a point to which I had ante alluded, for the Prime Minister can’t be expected to fill in for himself: after all, he is absent from Trinidad and Tobago or flat out in his sick bed, or debarred because his wicket was taken in the House of Representatives; or can he?

One also needs to take special note that nowhere in Section 78 (1) is the President bestowed any power whatsoever to appoint someone to ACT as Prime Minister; since Section 78 (1) only permits him to or bestows on him the power to authorise some incumbent Minister, other than the incumbent Prime Minister, to perform SOME of the constitutionally-conferred Prime Ministerial functions.

If here it appears that I am playing with semantics, I am not: I am just repeating what the Constitution says, for “hoc opus mea est jus dicere non est just dare” (“my task here is to interpret the law not to write the law”), and what the Constitution says is plainly visible and is written in English.

Forsooth, with unyielding consistency, the Constitution throughout is vigilant in cultivating the distinction between the expressions “acting for” and “performing the functions of”.

There can be no doubt that the expression “to act for” is all-embracing, since it always involves “the actor” temporarily assuming the substantive office of an absent officer (whether the absence is temporary or otherwise) and as a consequence temporarily performing the functions of the office in question, whilst the other expression contemplates that there is no such assumption, just a temporary re-assignment of some or all of the duties of an absentee officer to some other officer.

An examination of Section 27 (reproduced below) will furnish adequate justifiable proof of what I just said:

1. Where the office of President is vacant or the President is incapable of performing his functions as President by reason of his absence from Trinidad and Tobago or by reason of illness, the President of the Senate shall act temporarily as President.

2. Where the President of the Senate is for any reason unable to act as President under subsection (1) or section 36(2) the functions of President shall be performed by Speaker. (See! There is a difference between “act as” and “perform the functions of”.)

3. Where the Speaker is for any reason unable to perform the functions of President under subsection (2), the Vice-President of the Senate shall perform those functions, so however that a meeting of the Electoral College shall be held, upon the summons of the Deputy Speaker giving at least forty-eight hours notice thereof, within seven days of the Vice-President of the Senate commencing to perform the functions of President for the purpose of holding an election of a person to fill the vacancy in the office of President under section 26(5), or of a person to act temporarily as President during such period as the President is incapable of performing his functions.(Note: the election can appoint somebody “to act”, not merely “to perform the functions of”).

4. Upon his election to fill the vacancy in the office of President under section 26(5) or to act temporarily as President during such period as the President is incapable of performing his functions in accordance with subsection (3) the person shall immediately assume office. (Note: the actor assumes office)

With that in mind, if Section 78 is really valid, then there could never be an “acting” Prime Minister.

So far, I believe that I have shown that there is nothing in Section 78 to set aside or depreciate aught that is stipulated in Section 76 (1), which, I repeat, requires that, when Parliament is not in dissolution, every Prime Minister (which expression in accordance with Section 3 (2) also means “every acting Prime Minister or every person performing the official Prime Ministerial functions”) MUST be, inter alia, a member of the House of Representatives.

It is impossible therefore for anyone to ever interpret Section 78 as giving the green light for a Senator to be appointed Prime Minister (as defined in Section 3 (2) of the Constitution) as so doing would result in Section 78 being rendered inconsistent and incompatible with every such Section of the Constitution which without surrender, advises and instructs that the Prime Minister must be chosen from among the members of the House of Representatives and that only Ministers other than the Prime Minister can be chosen from the Senate.

In any event, as I mentioned before, if one should read the Constitution the way it should be read, taken as a whole, and not in bits and pieces, then Section 78 (1) would not be read in isolation for, in so doing, one would be taking it out of context. To place it in its proper context it must be juxtaposed to several other sections of our Constitution, including the relevant part of Section 3 (2), the whole of Section 76 (1), 76 (3), 78 and 79 (2); if not, one would arrive at the wrong interpretation, which, in my opinion, is what has been happening.

When those sections are so juxtaposed, they read as follows:

(3) (2) In this Constitution:

a. a reference to an appointment to any office shall be construed as including a reference to the appointment of a person to act in or perform the functions of the office at any time when the office is vacant or the holder thereof is unable (whether by reason of absence or infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) to perform the functions of that office; and

b. a reference to the holder of any office by the term designating his office shall be construed as including a reference to any person for the time being lawfully acting in OR performing the functions of that office.

76 (1) Where there is occasion for the appointment of a Prime Minister, the President SHALL appoint as Prime Minister:

a. a member of the House of Representatives who is the Leader in that House of the party which commands the support of the majority of members of that House; or

b. where it appears to him that that party does not have an undisputed leader IN THAT HOUSE or that no party commands the support of such a majority, the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is most likely to command the support of the majority of members of that House;

and who is willing to accept the office of Prime Minister.

76 (3) The Ministers other than the Prime Minister shall be such persons as the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, shall appoint from among the members of the House of Representatives and the Senators.

78 (1) Where the Prime Minister is absent from Trinidad and Tobago or is unable by reason of illness or of the provisions of section 77(4) to perform the functions conferred on him by this Constitution, the President MAY authorise some other member of the Cabinet to perform those functions, other than the functions conferred by subsection (2), and that member may perform those functions until his authority is revoked by the President.

78 (2) The powers of the President under this section SHALL BE EXERCISED BY HIM in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, SAVE THAT WHERE the President considers that it is impracticable to obtain the advice of the Prime Minister owing to his absence or illness, OR WHERE the Prime Minister is unable to tender advice by reason of the provisions of section 77(4) the President may exercise those powers without the advice of the Prime Minister.

79 (2) Where a Minister is incapable of performing his functions by reason of absence from Trinidad and Tobago or by reason of illness the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may appoint a member of the House of Representatives or a Senator TO ACT in the office of such Minister during such absence or illness.

Like me, at first one might think that the first four words of Section 79 (2): “Where a Minister is…” includes the Prime Minister, who undisputedly is a Minister. However, because of the context in which 79 (2) is placed, that expression obviously excludes the Prime Minister. In that light, Section 79 (2) can be said to give a good lesson regarding the need for one to keep things always in their proper context.

But I really want to deal with something much more significant about 79 (2).

Do the words “…may appoint a member of the House of Representatives or a Senator TO ACT in the office of such Minister during such absence or illness…” authorise the President to appoint ANY member of The House of Representatives, or ANY Senator to act for the incumbent Minister?

If the answer to that is yes, then the President of the Senate could be appointed, the Vice-President of the Senate could be appointed, the Speaker could be appointed or the Deputy Speaker could be appointed, without any of them having to give up their substantive office, as Sections 45 (4) (b) and 50 (5) (a) (ii), as the case may be, require.

I so pontificate because, once one allows that Section 78 overrides Sections 3 (2) and 76 (1) and (3), one cannot thereafter turn around and say that Section 79 (2) does not override Sections 45 (4) (b) and 50 (5) (a) (ii), as the case may be. Nor can one thereafter turn around and say that Section 78 (1) does not override Section 77 (1), (2) and (4) as well as 75 (2). In other words, what I am saying is that:

“What is good for the goose is good for the…?”

By the way, what are the constitutional directives with regard to appointing someone temporarily to perform the functions of a Minister who, under Section 77 (5), ceases to perform his Ministerial functions? I pose that question because:

1. Under the provisions of that section, the Minister does not vacate his seat in the House or the Senate as the case may be, but is debarred from performing his functions related to such membership and is consequently debarred from performing his functions as Minister, and

2. Section 79 (2) stipulates that someone could be appointed to act ONLY WHEN the substantive Minister is incapable because he is absent from Trinidad and Tobago, or is ill. It lays down no other permitting circumstance.

Constitutionally, other than such Minister’s appointment being revoked altogether and thereafter a new Minister being appointed to replace him, the only course permissible is that which is spelt out in 79 (1), which states:

“The President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may, by directions in writing, assign to the Prime Minister or any other Minister responsibility for any business of the government of Trinidad and Tobago, including the administration of any department of government.”

So, in the scenario of Section 77 (5), the responsibilities of the unfortunate Minister would have to be transferred, lock, stock and barrel, to some other extant Minister or Ministers, effectively leading to the dismantling his Ministry.

Let’s return now to my main theme.

If one were to look again at Section 78 (2), one would notice it makes mention of Section 77 (4). Here is what Section 77 (4) says:

“Where at any time THE PRIME MINISTER is required under the provisions of section 49(3) to cease to perform his functions as a member of the House of Representatives, he shall cease during such time to perform any of his functions as Prime Minister.”

In the context of this document, to understand fully the significance of Section 77 (4) one needs also to read what Section 77 (5) of our Constitution says.

Section 77 (5) states:

“Where at any time A MINISTER OTHER THAN THE PRIME MINISTER is required under Section 43(3) or Section 49(3) to cease to perform his functions as a member of the House to which he belongs, he shall cease during such time to perform any of his functions as Minister.”

It is immediately noticeable that Section 77 (5) substantially differs from Section 77 (4) in that Section 77 (5), while confining itself to a Minister who is not the Prime Minister, stipulates that its provisions shall apply whenever there may arise of the circumstances as are described in Section 43 (3) OR Section 49 (3).

If it were possible for a Senator to be the Prime Minister, why would Section 77, at its subsection (4), when referring to the Prime Minister (which, remember, the Constitution says includes any person acting as or performing the functions of Prime Minister), constrict itself by only mentioning Section 49 (3), while, on the other hand, the same Section 77, at its subsection (5), when referring to a Minister other than the Prime Minister, expands to embrace Section 43 (3).

The logical and only answer has to be that it so does because, once Parliament is not in dissolution, the Prime Minister must be a member of The House of Representatives, since Section 43 (3) refers to members of the Senate, while Section 49 (3) refers to members of the House of Representatives. Surely, if it were constitutionally possible for a Senator to be the Prime Minister, no such distinction would have been made.

The following question also must be asked:

Why does Section 77 (4), in talking about the Prime Minister having to cease performing his functions, use the expression “as a member of “the House of Representatives” and not use the same expression as Section 77 (5) does, that is “as a member of the House to which he belongs”?

Again, there is but one logical answer and that is that the House of Representatives is, can be, may be or shall be the only House of which the Prime Minister (which includes whoever is is, at any time, acting as or performing the functions of the Prime Minister), can be a member.

That answer also is strong justification for asserting that when Parliament is in dissolution, the Prime Minister must also latently belong to the House of Representatives, by which I mean that when the Parliament is in dissolution, if some person is to be appointed as Prime Minister that person would be required to have been a member of the just-dissolved House of Representatives. Why? Because, as I mentioned before, in a certain circumstance, to wit, under Section 68 (4), a just dissolved Parliament can be re-convened before general elections. Here is Section 68 (4):

“Where, between a dissolution of Parliament and the next ensuing general election of members to the House of Representatives, an emergency arises of such a nature that in the opinion of the Prime Minister, it is necessary for the two Houses to be summoned before that general election can be held, the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may summon the two Houses of the preceding Parliament but the election of members of the House of Representatives shall proceed and the Parliament that has been summoned shall, if not sooner dissolved, again stand dissolved on the day on which the general election is held.”

And once Parliament is not in dissolution, the selection criteria of 76 (1) must be followed. One also has to remember that the mere act of Parliament being dissolved does not lead to there being a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister. The Prime Minister continues in office, and having been properly appointed to office from the ranks of the House of Representatives, he resumes his role as a member of the House of Representatives in the circumstance portrayed by Section 68 (4), for this is what Section 77 (2) (b) says:

The Prime Minister shall also vacate his office-

a. when after any dissolution of Parliament he is informed by the President that the President is about to re-appoint him as Prime Minister or to appoint another person as Prime Minister; or

b. where for any reason other than a dissolution of Parliament he ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives.

Of course, the above arguments would not be relevant if, for instance, every member of the House of Representatives suddenly dies, a scenario, about which, since not long after the dastardly events of 1990, I had written to the then Prime Minister, suggesting that our Constitution does not make any provisions whatsoever for any clear-cut process for ensuring the succession of Parliamentary and Executive power in such scenario. But that shall the subject of further research that I am to undertake, God willing.

Despite all that I have thus far said, let us, again for argument’s sake, assume that constitutionally it were possible for a Senator to become Prime Minister by being appointed to act as or to perform the functions of the Prime Minister. What then would happen if such “senatorial Prime Minister” falls into of the circumstances described in Section 43 (3), that is to say?

a. if he is sentenced to death, or

b. is declared bankrupt, or

c. is convicted of an offence relating to elections?

I’ll explain what would happen! What would happen is that he would remain in office! Why? Because Section 77 (4) does not apply to him, as he is not a member of the House of Representatives.

But then neither would Section 77 (5), as he, being the Prime Minister (by operations of Section 3 (2)), is exempted from being required to cease functioning as Prime Minister.

And, for the same reasons as I have just given, neither Section 77 (2) (b) nor Section 77 (3) would apply.

Bluntly speaking, in any circumstance of that nature, the folly of the writers of our Constitution would be shown up in a most glaring manner, because Section 77 (5) then would be seen for what is was- a complete superfluity.

Taking a slightly different bent, Section 75 requires that, AT ALL TIMES, there must be a Prime Minister. In fact, this is what it says:

1. “There shall be a Cabinet for Trinidad and Tobago, which shall have the general direction and control of the government of Trinidad and Tobago and shall be collectively responsible therefore to Parliament.

2. The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister and such number of other Ministers (of whom one shall be the Attorney General), appointed in accordance with the provisions of Section 76, as the Prime Minister may consider appropriate.”

One need not be reminded of how the words “Prime Minister” and “appointed” are to be interpreted.

Seeing that Section 75 (2) of our Constitution requires that the Cabinet at all times must contain at least three Ministers- the Prime Minister, the Attorney-General and one other, it follows that there can be no Cabinet without such three Ministers, and an irrefutable inference from that statement is that there must always be somebody capable of performing, and in fact performing the functions of Prime Minister, otherwise, no Cabinet!

And given that Section 78 (1) states that where he is absent from Trinidad and Tobago or where, because of his illness or the operations of Section 77 (4) the Prime Minister is rendered incapable of performing his duties as Prime Minister, the President may appoint some other Minister to perform some of the Prime Ministerial functions, it obviously follows that, when circumstances like those do happen, somebody who is in Trinidad and Tobago has to be the one to be appointed to perform the functions of Prime Minister.

In the face of all the arguments that I have thus far presented in support of my assertion that there is nothing, neither in the whole of Section 78, nor, for that matter, in any other part of our Constitution, which sets aside and or overrides aught of the commandments of Section 3 (2) or, of Section 76 (1) or of Section 76 (3), only the most illogically-inclined would yet venture to suggest that Section 78 (1) sanctions the existing practice of Trinidad and Tobago having a “senatorial Prime Minister”.

Another potent argument is that, due to Section 75 (2), the President cannot appoint the incumbent Attorney-General to perform the function of Prime Minister. So what is the inference to be drawn from that argument? The inference is that Section 78 is subject to Section 75 (2). Which begs the question: “What is the difficulty in appreciating that Section 78 is also subject to other Sections of the Constitution, to wit, principally Section 76?”

Don’t even think about attempting to tell me that in Section 78, the conjunction “where” means “every time”! My swift rebuttal would be, “So what does the same term, “where”, mean in Section 76 (1)!

At best, Section 78, all of it, can only be interpreted in the manner whereby I already did, and at worst, it is null and void and of no effect whatsoever, and completely expurgating it would moderate naught of the efficacy of our Constitution.

Therefore, I reiterate that the practice, first begun during the Prime Ministerial tenure of the late Dr. Eric Williams, of the President appointing a member of the Senate to act as Prime Minister, is ultra vires our Constitution and consequently renders illegal any such appointment.

I might here mention in passing that the very wording of Section 3 (2) (b), which, several times ante, I have quoted, does contemplate someone being unlawfully appointed to act as Prime Minister, a fact that patently is bolstered by Section 3 (3) which states that:

“Where by this Constitution any person is directed, or power is conferred on any person or authority, to appoint a person to perform the functions of an office if the holder thereof is unable to perform those functions, the validity of any performance of those functions by the persons directed or any appointment made in exercise of that power shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that the holder of the office is not unable to perform the functions of that office.”

It does not take much out of us therefrom to deduce that the appointment of an acting Prime Minister can be called into question on some other grounds where, for example, as in the case that I am herein making, the person appointed to act, constitutionally is debarred from being appointed to act.

I will deal now with Section 76 (4) which I quote as follows:

“Where occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of Prime Minister while Parliament is dissolved, a person who, at the time of the appointment, is a Minister may be appointed as Prime Minister.”

If read in isolation, Section 76 (4) apparently allows any incumbent Minister to be appointed as the Prime Minister when Parliament is in dissolution. But that is not so at all, since, for the same reasons that I already stated, especially in respect of Sections 68 (4), 78 (2) and 79 (2), all Section 76 (4) does is that it makes it quite clear that an incumbent Minister (which includes the incumbent Prime Minister), all of whom, before the Parliament was dissolved, must have met the Prime Ministerial qualifications as stipulated in Section 76 (1), cannot be debarred from being appointed as Prime Minister while the Parliament stands dissolved, on the grounds that he is an incumbent Minister (or the incumbent Prime Minister).

But what are the events that can lead to Parliament being dissolved. An examination and understanding of those events would effulge the import of Section 76 (4).

Section 68 (1) provides that Parliament could be dissolved at the whim and fancy of the Prime Minister as follows:

“The President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister may, at any time, prorogue or dissolve Parliament.”

While Section 77 (1) provides that, in a special circumstance, at the option of the Prime Minister, it may be dissolved as follows:

“Where the House of Representatives passes a resolution, supported by the votes of a majority of all the members of the House, declaring that it has no confidence in the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister does not within seven days of the passing of such resolution either resign or advise the President to dissolve Parliament, the President shall revoke the appointment of the Prime Minister.”

I have purposely positioned together these two sections, for in my view, they should always be read together.

Regarding Section 77 (1), where the Prime Minister so resigns, it is hardly likely that the President would re-appoint the out-going Prime Minister. Why? Because the out going Prime Minister has just failed the second mandatory litmus test for determining a person’s eligibility to be appointed Prime Minister, which is spelt out in Section 76 (1), that is, he has proved that his group in that House is unable to command the support of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives. And if some of those who have withdrawn their support are members of his group, it means that his claim to be leader in that House of such group is no longer valid; meaning that he also has failed the third mandatory litmus test.

As a consequence, the President must rely on the provisions of Section 76 (1) (b) to determine who shall be the new Prime Minister.

In such circumstances, Section 76 (4) permits him to select an outgoing Minister, other than the outgoing Prime Minister, providing always that such Minister meet the constitutionally ordained eligibility criteria for the post, which I have already mentioned.

And for those same reasons, where under 77 (1) the Parliament is dissolved, the President, should he decide to appoint some other person as Prime Minister, would also be guided by Section 76 (1) (b), but, in this case, he would also be very cognisant of the implications of Section 68 (4).

Allow me now to digress a bit into the realm of fiction.

I am about to paint a chilling picture of what could occur if I am wrong on all counts. Picture the following:

This is the story of some well-known, notorious, malicious power, who has tremendous financial and other resources at his disposal, and who, for sinister motives, has a burning desire to become Prime Minister. However, due to his background, it would be impossible for him personally to lead a political party to victory in the polls. So, what sinister master plan does he hatch in order yet to accomplish his objective? In Trinidad and Tobago there is a local proverb:

“It have more than one way to skin a cat!”

Well he decides to use part of those resources literally to buy some nondescript politician whom, in relatively quick time, he grooms into a nationally acceptable candidate for prime ministership, as leader of his own political party, a party stuffed with cronies of the puppet master.

The puppet eventually becomes the Prime Minister and promptly returns the “favour” by having his master appointed to the Senate.

However, very early in his term of office, the Prime Minister “suddenly falls ill”, and remains “ill” for an extended period. So, guess what! The “suddenly ill” Prime Minister, as his “illness” renders him unable to perform his Prime Ministerial functions, advises the new President, who, by the way, is another crony, to appoint, yes, the reader knows who, to perform the functions of Prime Minster.

And so, the puppet master becomes the Prime Minister, and gains total control of our country and all its rich resources.

It sounds implausible, doesn’t it?

But while implausible might be homonymous to, it is not synonymous with impossible!

And it would become synonymous only if a Senator can be lawfully appointed to act as or perform the duties of Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.

I thank God that our Constitution, as deficient as it may be in some respects, once interpreted in the proper way, forbids anyone being able to take hold Prime Ministerial reins except in any other fashion but by being popularly elected.

Conclusions:

As I prepare to close, I would summarise, as follows, my view of what the provisions of our Constitution should dictate regarding the appointing of a person temporarily to replace an incumbent Prime Minister:

1. “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution whenever the circumstance arises that an incumbent Prime Minister, for whatever reason, is unable to perform his functions as Prime Minister, the President shall appoint a member of the House of Representatives other than the member who substantively holds the office of Prime Minister temporarily to act as Prime Minister, but if such circumstance arises while Parliament is in dissolution, then an incumbent Minister who was a member of the preceding House of Representatives shall be so appointed; and

2. Where, under subsection (1) above, no such other member, for whatever reason, is available then the President may select some member of the Senate who was appointed thereto on the advice of the Prime Minister temporarily to act as Prime Minister, but if, for whatever reason, there be no such Senator available, then the President may appoint some other person who under this Constitution is qualified to be elected to the House of Representatives temporarily to act as Prime Minister.”

3. Further to subsections (1) and (2) above, no incumbent Attorney-General shall be eligible to be so appointed, and any person temporarily appointed so to act shall continue so to act until the sooner of such time as his acting appointment is revoked by the President, or, such time as such incumbent Prime Minister again becomes able to perform the functions of his office.

I wish to commend the above encapsulation for inclusion in our Constitution as a replacement for the existing Section 78. Such replacement would also require a slight amendment to Section 80, in that in subsection (3) (a) thereof the words, “or Section 78” would be added after “or (4)”, and the existing subsection (3) (b) would be deleted and the existing subsection (3) (c) would be renumbered as subsection (3) (b). So that Section 80 (3) in its entirety would then read as follows:

a. in the exercise of the power to appoint the Prime Minister conferred upon him by section 76(1) or (4) or section 78;

b. in the exercise of the power to appoint the Leader of the Opposition and to revoke any such appointment conferred upon him by section 83.”

Given what the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago preponderantly provides, one cannot but conclude that:

1. every President of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, is sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution; and that,

2. the President of Trinidad and Tobago is nobody’s rubber stamp; and that,

3. with respect to the appointment of any Prime Minister, Sections 3 (2) and 76 of the Constitution take precedence over all other constitutional provisions; and that,

4. with respect to the appointment of any Prime Minister, Sections 3 (2) and 76 of the Constitution imposes upon the President a duty which has cannot shirk; and that,

5. it is constitutionally forbidden for any Senator to be appointed as Prime Minister, which, due to Section 3 (2) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, means that it is constitutionally forbidden for any Senator to be appointed to act as or the perform the functions of Prime Minister when, for whatever reason, the substantive holder of the office of Prime Minister is unable to perform the functions of his post; and that,

6. every Senator who was purportedly appointed to act as or to perform the functions of Prime Minister was unlawfully appointed because they, being members of the Senate, were debarred from being so appointed; and that,

7. as a result, there are far-reaching consequences arising out of such appointments, especially with regard to the legality of decisions made and or actions taken by such “unlawfully” appointed Prime Ministers and the Cabinets led by such “unlawfully” appointed Prime Ministers; and that,

8. such consequences would need to be expeditiously addressed, possibly by enacting legislation to ratify whatever such decisions and or actions were; and that,

9. given the extant constitutional framework, it is incumbent on every President to ensure that no essay be ever again made to appoint any Senator to act as or perform the functions of Prime Minister, for it is quite clear that to do so would be in serious breach of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, which, might I repeat, every President of Trinidad and Tobago is sworn to preserve and defend.

I shall close by rendering in English the meaning of the old Roman adage that guides me:

“We know that the law is good, if we use it in a legitimate manner.”

God Bless Trinidad and Tobago.